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The Ideal and Non-Ideal in Behavior
Guidance: Reflections on Law and Buddhism
in Conversation with the Dalai Lama
KENNETH M. EHRENBERGt
In a perfect society, where everyone is governed by the
principles of compassion, where everyone sees everyone
else's interests as having at least as much value as one's
own, where everyone has mastered desire so that it no
longer causes avoidable suffering, there would be as little
need for law as there would be for the concept of justice.1
But of course we don't live in a perfect society (far from it).
So we need systems of behavior guidance to help us to do as
best as we can by one another. Hence there is no perfect
legal system because each must accommodate the different
imperfections of various individuals and cultures. Clearly
the Dalai Lama is aware of this and his remarks should be
interpreted with this in mind.
Even admitting the need for systems to guide our
interpersonal and social behavior, however, there are
different forms these systems can take. Some systems seem
to recognize and incorporate our imperfections and
limitations. These seem to admit the impossibility of the
task of perfecting society and seek rather to minimize the
damage our imperfections do. Other systems seem to
concentrate more on closing the distance between our
t Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Research Associate Professor of Law,
University at Buffalo, SUNY, 135 Park Hall, Buffalo, NY 14260.
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1. See DAVID HUME, AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS 84-
85 (Tom L. Beauchamp ed., Oxford University Press 1999) (1751) (arguing that,
as a value, justice does not arise where people treat each other as dear as
themselves). While it might be true that we still might have coordination
problems that require solutions, it is not clear that we would need a legal
system to do so. A mutually recognized authority might be enough to
accomplish this without the need for a legal system to support it. See generally
Leslie Green, Law Co-Ordination and the Common Good, 3 OXFORD J. LEGAL
STUD. 299 (1983).
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condition and perfection as much as possible, treating our
limitations as surmountable given the right training and
attitude. I will call these systems "ideal" in that they
concentrate on the ideal situation and on inculcating in us
behavior that is designed to get us as close as possible to
that ideal. I will call the former kinds of systems "non-ideal"
in that they seem to treat our limitations as unavoidable
but minimizable.
It would be far too easy to associate the ideal form of
behavior guidance with Buddhism and the non-ideal with
law. We might be able to imagine systems that are
completely ideal or non-ideal, but since these descriptions
are meant to explain forms of behavior guidance, we are
likely to find elements of both in any given system.
Furthermore, the systems themselves are likely to
intertwine and interact, as they can and do with Buddhism
and law, law and etiquette, monastic law and secular law,
Buddhism and local religions, custom and religion, custom
and law, etc.
Take the example of morality. Clearly morality is
reflected in some way in both Buddhism and law.2 But
morality itself has aspects of both ideal and non-ideal forms
of behavior guidance. This is what Fuller calls the "morality
of aspiration" and the "morality of duty."' 3 The morality of
duty operates by setting basic standards of behavior that
people ought to meet as they are seen as the minimum
requirements for reasonably harmonious living.4 The
morality of aspiration is seen in terms of "the fullest
realization of human powers," as the imperative to excel as
much as possible in all endeavors, realizing all of one's
potential. 5 There is no sharp distinction between these
forms of morality; they represent, rather, attitudes or types
of positions we can take with regard to morality's operation
2. The reflection in law is admitted even by the most ardent legal
positivists. E.g., H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 193 (2d ed. 1994); Joseph
Raz, About Morality and the Nature of Law, 48 AM. J. JuRIs. 1, 3 (2003). Of
course, they deny that there is any necessary connection between law and
morality (as opposed to reflection of one in the other).
3. LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAw 5 (rev. ed. 1977). Fuller cites a variety
of mid-century theorists (including Hart) to support this distinction. See id. at 5
n.2.
4. See id. at 6.
5. Id. at 5.
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in guiding behavior. 6 But we do have a tendency to use one
or the other as we get farther from the middle of a spectrum
between them. 7 Hence we will tend to treat actions that
seem to threaten the social fabric more basically as
violations of duty, and actions that lessen our individual or
collective ability to achieve our ideals and pursue perfection
as regrettable wastes or character flaws.
Both of these styles of morality are represented in both
Buddhism and law. In Western secular democracies, we are
more accustomed to seeing the law as a system that
basically operates according to the morality of duty, and
Buddhism and other religious ethical systems as systems
that operate according to the morality of aspiration.8
However, legal systems have their own forms of excellence
toward which they are supposed to encourage people, and
Buddhism has its basic rules (especially in the monastic
traditions).
Problems arise when these two forms of behavioral
guidance fall into tension as a result of disputes over our
conceptions of the ideal. In religious circles, this can result
in a schism. In the legal arena, it is can result in civil war.
So in the Western secular legal tradition, we prefer our
legal systems to stick to the non-ideal, to remain silent on
conceptions of the good or of the ideal, to focus on the
morality of duty.9 However, a strange thing happens on the
way to eliminating the ideal: rather than getting
eliminated, it becomes internalized as the ideal of the rule
of law, the "internal morality" of aspiration for legal
systems. 10 We idealize the procedures of the law and its
operation, striving to make our "government of laws and
not of men."11
6. See id. at 9.
7. See id. at 10.
8. But cf. id. at 5-6 (giving the Ten Commandments, and the Old Testament
more generally, as examples of moralities of duty).
9. This is truer of modern Western legal systems and those based on them,
than it is of more traditionally bound systems or legal systems in communities
bound together by a common ideal they wish reflected in their law. If the risks
of dissention are low due to the entrenchment of the ideology or the coercion of
the people, then the law can be seen more easily as a tool for pursuing
perfection.
10. See FULLER, supra note 3 at 41.
11. MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. XXX.
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This means that we adopt and elevate procedures by
which to guide our behavior and settle our disputes. Those
procedures do not separate citizens based on their beliefs or
what they hope to accomplish in life. The need for an
internal, procedural ideal is magnified the more diverse
society becomes and the more citizens have differing views
of the good. In such circumstances, the fewer procedural
norms a legal system has in place, the more prone that
legal system will be to failures of the "internal" legal
principles such as those against retroactivity or requiring
that laws be clear.12
To take it one step further, a secular democratic legal
system would, from the point of view of the ideal theory,
reinforce and even inculcate pernicious patterns of behavior
and misguided systems of belief. The ideal theory doesn't
accommodate fundamental ignorance and disagreement, it
corrects them. 13 The non-ideal rule of law accommodates
fundamental ignorance and disagreement insofar as it does
not impinge on the pursuits of others. Once you endorse (as
does the Dalai Lama) a secular democratic legal system and
the notion of the rule of law that comes with it, then you
magnify the tension between the ideal theory that claims
universal principles as its basis and the non-ideal need to
accommodate both the imperfections and differences in
opinion.
Buddhist practice is perfectionist, based on an ideal of
the attainment of enlightenment and nirvana through
practices that must be correctly motivated on the basis of
universal values such as compassion.1 4 As a universal
value, natural compassion can make a claim to substantive
inclusion in a legal system, but the more a legal system
12. Fuller cites eight principles as the internal moral principles of law: the
need for general rules, the need to publicize, the need for prospectivity, the need
for the rules to be understandable, the need for the rules not to contradict one
another, the need for the rules not to require the impossible of those at whom
they are directed, the need for the rules to be relatively stable, and the need for
the rules as they are publicized to match with how they are actually
administered. See FULLER, supra note 3, at 39.
13. While disagreement and debate are very much a part of many religious
traditions, especially Tibetan Buddhism, these disagreements take place in the
context of a commonality of purpose and a monastic legal framework that
prevents them from leading to strife and disharmony.
14. It is still an ideal theory even if it counsels us to avoid goal-directedness
in the pursuit of enlightenment.
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endorses this value (and especially a particular method of
its protection and promotion), the more substantive norms
creep into the legal system, which risks alienating and
disadvantaging those who disagree. Even if we say that, as
a universal value, one cannot help but value compassion,
people can still disagree fundamentally on the means of its
pursuit. If the law does not make space for those
disagreements, those in the minority or not in power will be
disenfranchised and marginalized. Naturally, a legal
system founded upon the principle of compassion would still
treat those who resist that system compassionately.
However, that compassionate treatment cannot rise to the
level of inclusion in a system with which one has a
fundamental disagreement. Disagreement, disenfranchisement,
and marginalization, without an understructure of
commonality and unity of purpose, are likely to lead to
resentment, dissatisfaction, and strife. Hence the legal
system itself, by its operation, runs the risk of undermining
the very detachment and compassion Buddhism counsels.
Of course this is not to say that Buddhist law is
oxymoronic. Rather, recognition of the tension between
what Buddhism counsels and how secular democratic law
operates can help to remind legal practitioners and citizens
to reinforce their compassion in the face of legal failure or
exclusion.
2007] 679

